Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang
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 | Product Details: Hardcover 336 pages Release Date: 19 May 2009 Publisher: Simon & Schuster ISBN: 1439149380 Rating:   Sales Rank: 46649 | | Look for similar books by subject: | | Customers who bought this item also bought:
| | Customer Reviews: An Unique and Critical Document in the history of PRC and CCP (24 November 2009)In the 60's of 20th century,Liu Shaoqi,former president of PRC, senior leader of CCP died in a secret place without no reason.In the first ten years of 21st century Zhao Ziyang,former general secratary of CCP,died with great disappointment and regret about CCP and reform of China.Who will be the next one? Editors Did Great, Could Have Gone Extra Mile (31 October 2009)Most people miss the two bottom lines that I found engaging: 1. China's government is a screwed up bureaucracy with petty egos just like ours. 2. China produced moderate pragmatist Premier Zhao Ziyang, promoted him, and empowered him. With all due respect to all those wailing and moaning about the years of house arrest, this book is phenomenal for documenting the above two points alone, and Premier Zhao Ziyang will stand in history as one of the greatest leaders along with Mao Zedong (their rendition, I always preferred Mao Tse-tung) and Deng Xiaoping. The book consists of six parts with thirty-sevel chapters bracketed by an introduction and an epilogue. It is based on tapes smuggled out from China and made secretly by Zhao Ziyang, and while I do not discount a marvelous Information Operation (IO) by the Chinese (along with Cuba, my two most admired counterpart intelligence services), on balance this appears to be the real deal. The primary focus of this book is on the three years in power, NOT on the decades in provincial positions where he was a pragmatic and extraordinarily successful leader; nor on the decade of house arrest. This book is a "Memorandum for the Record" as the protagonist remembers it, naming names all along the way. It is important to note that Zhao Ziyang was rehabilitated by Mao himself, and this is a testament to the fact that Zhao, like so many others, was improperly demoted to rehabilitation and remediation camps. The book publishes the outcome of the failed investigation into Zhao Ziyang, which was itself never published in China or shared outside the small circle of power. Most will focus on the student unrest and the Tieneman Square confrontation. While I have already summed up what mattered to me from this book, the following quote is very worthwhile: "I refused to be the General Secretary who mobilized the military to crack down on the students." Deng comes across as a great leader who is open to change surrounded by others who prefer the planned economy, and having a difficult time "herding cats" at the top. I am very impressed by the agricultural reform and the move away from collective farming to "those who farm will have land," which unleashed the entrepreneurial power of individual production. There is a chapter on the special eceonomic zones, and a lot of focus on anti-corruption efforts which by this book's account appear to have been overdone. There was huge internal conflict over foreign investment, and a really impressive focus at the top on scale and efficiency. These are SMART leaders, whatever their petty peronal issues might be. Zhao Ziyang ran the Chinese economy for ten years, and I put down the book stunned with both his success, and with the inadequacy of the book in communicating that success in raw terms related to the complexity of China, second perhaps only to India in that regard (complexity, they are co-equal in standing with Brazil, Indonesia, and Russia, and soon I might add Turkey and Iran). He learned from the French and the British that massive irrigation projects seeking to control nature were not smart, and instead refocused China on farming with nature. See Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in America for additional perspective on why this is so righteous. I grew up in Asia, and still treasure the copy of The Little Red Book that was given to my father when he was acpatured by Vietnamese militia sailing past Hainan on his way to Hong Kong. I am very familiar with the catch phrases that China was always used to summarize complex policies, and this book does not lack of them: "Emancipating the Mind" along with "Remaining Clean (of Corruption)" and "Practice is the sole criterion of Truth" are among my favorites from this particular work. China graduates more high school HONOR students than the USA graduates from across its ENTIRE dumbed-down high school population, and that's the ugly truth. In find 1988 featured in the protagonist's memory as a really tough year, and observe that is also the year in which Bin Laden started the global creation of madrasses teaching the virulent form of Wahabbism funded by Saudi Arabia, and also the year in which General Al Gray, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, created the first intelligence center in the USA focused on global coverage, and realized that we were failing to both study the Third World and failing to make proper use of open sources of information. 1988 will be the year in which future histories begin their story about the implosion of the USA, the end of predatory immoral capitalism, and the rise of collective public intelligence and conscious capitalism. I learn that China is *very* succeptible to rumor and panic buying. I find the conclusion to be fantastic. In his reflections under house arrest, Zhoa Ziyang concluded that China must extablish political liberty to acompnay economic freedom, and stressed the need to manage multi-level dialog and freedom of the press. In retirement he found socialism shallow and converted to parliamentary democracy as the best possible means for managing complex China. There is an analysis of Deng that includes a description of Deng as "empty words" and a conclusion that Deng absolutely refused actual political reform. Generally Deng is believed to have moved away from Mao, but to have been too senior for others to challenge so they took it out on Zhao instead. On balance, being already impressed with China's economic progress, I can only wonder what might have been had Deng trusted his instincts and given Zhao all possible support. The back of the book offers a listing of names with one paragraph biographies, but it is not enough. The publisher should consider re-issuing this important work with many diagrams that show "who's who" in relation to specific party organs and policies across a time line. I have long stressed the need for a line of intelligence collection and analysis that focuses on "who said what when." CIA still does not know how to do that (or want to do that), so on issues from the Spratley Islands to Africa to Argentina and China's new south, generally the US Government has no clue. I started to give this book four stars, but on review of my notes, I have to come up to five stars. If they re-do the book as I have suggested, it will be listed at Phi Beta Iota as Beyond 6 Stars. Lacking Introspection (19 October 2009)I am still probably futiley hoping for a more personal biography of Zhao, but given his isolation before death, I may have to be satisfied with these extracts from his journal. I would have liked much more exploration on some of his thoughts, particularly on how he might have envisioned a parliamentary government to operate in China; given his likely attentions at the time of writing, I suppose I should be content with what's present. Zhao's economic insights are of particular note, as well as his discussions of Deng's limited practical involvement in political decision making. His analyses of Deng and Hu Yaobang are (as to be expected) much more objective and insightful than any personal introspections, and these insights do a lot to provide context for Chinese politics then and now. Hopefully one day a few of Zhao's more pragmatic and libertarian colleagues will come out and offer some true insights into the real man. Until then, we'll have to make do with this somewhat unobjective exploration of Zhao's thoughts in his final years. Portrait of a Technocrat (15 October 2009)Not soon, but one day, scholars will gain access to the documents, letters, diaries, and hidden correspondence of China's leadership over the last 30 years (and perhaps earlier). Then we will know the full story of how China emerged from the hell of the Cultural Revolution, and how it grappled with opening to the west. Until then, we will have to make do with the memoirs of Zhao Ziyang. It's a good start. As other reviewers have mentioned, Zhao's journal is absolutely critical in understanding the rivalries and fissures within the Chinese Communist Party during the 1980's. Even now, Prisoner of the State gives us an invaluable look at how China's leaders debated political and economic reforms, and many of the inner workings of the Party. For me, the most valuable lessons from Zhao's account derived from learning about the subtle ways in which leaders exerted power and influence. I was particularly struck by the continuing influence of "party elders" such as Chen Yun and Li Xiannian, even if they did not hold formal posts. Similarly, Prisoner brilliantly describes the ways in which Zhao, newly installed as CCP General Secretary, was able to muzzle the "anti-bourgeois liberalization" campaign that conservatives such as Li and Deng Lichun had advocated. Zhao never OPPOSED the campaign, but merely cabined it, forbidding editorials attacking individuals, preventing guilt-by-association tactics common during the Cultural Revolution, and enunciating the idea that true progress meant maintaining vigilance against both Left- and Right-deviationism. He also kept the Left at bay by eliminating their power centers, such as Red Flag magazine, and the research department of the Part Secretariat. Mao famously said that power flows from the barrel of a gun, but Zhao's picture shows something quite different: in Deng's China, power flowed from an ability to hold together political coalitions, keep one's opponents off guard and guessing as to your intentions, and -- of course -- maintaining the support of Deng himself. Zhao realized too late that he had failed in this critical third requirement. At times, he seems to fool even himself. In the first part of the book, Zhao claims that his political fall originated essentially in a mistake of etiquette. When Zhao was out of the country, conservatives scared Deng about the protests; the supreme leader called the protesters anti-socialist and anti-patriotic; conservatives published Deng's comments in the People's Daily; the students became angry and refused to stop until receiving a retraction; and since Deng could not admit a mistake, something had to give. But by the end of the memoir, Zhao concedes what he had failed to see previously, viz. Deng was simply not going to tolerate meaningful political reform. He was committed to the dominance of the CCP. Indeed, until the end of the book, Zhao seems unaware of the big picture political issue that underlies all the talk of China's future -- whether China will remain a Communist autocracy. Essentially, what emerges through most of the work is a portrait of a technocrat, cautiously and for the most part wisely moving toward market reforms, but seemingly oblivious to the question of the future of the Party. Even at the end of the book, Zhao seems to insist that parliamentary democracy will be beneficial not only to China, but to the Party itself. This is clearly false. Zhao was no democrat, and at the end of the book, he concludes that moving toward democracy is necessary only because it is a prerequisite for economic reform. But as of this writing, that diagnosis has been proved wrong: China's economy has moved ahead by leaps and bounds, and has become the second most important economy in the world, but the nation remains completely autocratic in the political sphere. Freedom and democracy are crucial for their own sake, not because they will help raise GDP. Zhao was the best of his generation, a man with the intelligence and flexibility to mastermind China's economic reforms, and with the seeming common decency to shy away from turning China's army on its best and brightest young students. In future decades, he will once again be honored in his own country. But he was not the man to bring democracy to China, and Prisoner of the State shows why. Initially Interesting; Ultimately Terribly Boring (21 September 2009)This is a somewhat enlightening and educational look at the inner workings of the Chinese Communist Party leadership during the late 1980s, including the Tiananmen Square massacres, as seen through the eyes of then Chinese Premier and General Secretary, Zhao Ziyang. Zhao Ziyang came to power in 1987, through the support of acknowledged supreme Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, with the charge to modernize the Chinese economy and pursue a path of political liberalism. When the Chinese student protests broke out, in response to the death of Zhao's predecessor, this pursuit of political liberalism evaporated under the heat of the reactionary members of the Chinese Central Committee. When these members were able to persuade Deng to support their policy of martial law and military response, Zhao's role in Chinese government came to an end. This book is a transcription of Zhao's thoughts concerning his period in power and the circumstances leading to his downfall and subsequent house arrest. The tapes that he made were certainly not authorized by the Chinese authorities and were only published after being smuggled out in pieces and reassembled outside China. While the first half of the book deals with the final years of his Communist Party leadership, the book then reverts to the earlier years of his service and at this point, the book lost much of its interest in my opinion. Quite frankly, it was terribly boring and something of a chore to complete. Suffice it to say that Zhao was a pawn in the leadership struggle between Deng Xioaping and other aged conservative Communist members of the Central Committee. By their nature, the writings are somewhat disjointed and poorly presented, though the editors do the readers a service by beginning each chapter with a historical context. The plethora of Chinese names is confusing and at times, difficult to follow from scene to scene. However, the inner workings of the Chinese Communist government during this historically monumental period in Chinese and world history are possibly enlightening and educational for those with an interest in the subject. First and foremost, Zhao seeks to absolve himself of any responsibility for the 1989 student massacres and the preceding economic upheavals, and by comparison to many of the other Communist hardliners, he was certainly a voice of moderation. Almost comically, however, he spends many pages arguing the illegality of his removal and subsequent house arrest, quoting chapter and verse from Communist Party procedural manuals and "Chinese Law", as though he were not a participant in a repressive, Communist autocracy, but instead was due the benefits of a western style democracy, governed by the rule of law. It was enough to make one exclaim, "DUDE, YOU ARE IN CHINA!! The same people that ordered the massacre of Chinese students are dealing with your case now. Deng Xiaoping is the putative Emperor of China; you are at his mercy and he is not pleased with your actions." The final half of the book is mired in economic theory and endless explanations and excuses for why the Chinese economy foundered during the relevant period. Again, it is hopelessly boring and poorly put together. I can truthfully give the first part of the book 3½ -4 stars due to the historical importance of the Tiananmen Square events and the behind the scenes look at the Chinese government's decision making process. At the point where the book reverts to Zhao's early years, however, the book becomes a one start effort. Go to the library, read the first half of the book and skip the rest. | |
